n of the high
spirit of self-sacrifice which the patriotic enthusiasm had elicited.
The spirit of patriotism has this peculiar characteristic, that while it
has evoked acts of heroism which are both very numerous and very
sublime, it has done so without presenting any prospect of personal
immortality as a reward. Of all the forms of human heroism, it is
probably the most unselfish. The Spartan and the Roman died for his
country because he loved it. The martyr's ecstasy of hope had no place
in his dying hour. He gave up all he had, he closed his eyes, as he
believed, for ever, and he asked for no reward in this world or in the
next. Even the hope of posthumous fame--the most refined and
supersensual of all that can be called reward--could exist only for the
most conspicuous leaders. It was examples of this nature that formed the
culminations or ideals of ancient systems of virtue, and they naturally
led men to draw a very clear and deep distinction between the notions of
interest and of duty. It may indeed be truly said, that while the
conception of what constituted duty was often very imperfect in
antiquity, the conviction that duty, as distinguished from every
modification of selfishness, should be the supreme motive of life, was
more clearly enforced among the Stoics than in any later society.

The reader will probably have gathered from the last chapter that there
are four distinct motives which moral teachers may propose for the
purpose of leading men to virtue. They may argue that the disposition of
events is such that prosperity will attend a virtuous life, and
adversity a vicious one--a proposition they may prove by pointing to the
normal course of affairs, and by asserting the existence of a special
Providence in behalf of the good in the present world, and of rewards
and punishments in the future. As far as these latter arguments are
concerned, the efficacy of such teaching rests upon the firmness with
which certain theological tenets are held, while the force of the first
considerations will depend upon the degree and manner in which society
is organised, for there are undoubtedly some conditions of society in
which a perfectly upright life has not even a general tendency to
prosperity. The peculiar circumstances and dispositions of individuals
will also influence largely the way in which they receive such teaching,
and, as Cicero observed, "what one utility has created, another will
often destroy."

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