ty passages of splendour which are tossed
from Alp to Alp over the azure of a thousand miles of champaign? Even
granting the constant vigour of observation, and supposing the
possession of such impossible knowledge, it needs but a moment's
reflection to prove how incapable the memory is of retaining for any
time the distinct image of the sources even of its most vivid
impressions. What recollection have we of the sunsets which delighted us
last year? We may know that they were magnificent, or glowing, but no
distinct image of colour or form is retained--nothing of whose _degree_
(for the great difficulty with the memory is to retain, not facts, but
_degrees_ of fact) we could be so certain as to say of anything now
presented to us, that it is like it. If we did say so, we should be
wrong; for we may be quite certain that the energy of an impression
fades from the memory, and becomes more and more indistinct every day;
and thus we compare a faded and indistinct image with the decision and
certainty of one present to the senses. How constantly do we affirm that
the thunderstorm of last week was the most terrible one we ever saw in
our lives, because we compare it, not with the thunderstorm of last
year, but with the faded and feeble recollection of it.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 73: From "Modern Painters," Vol. I, Pt. II, Sec. II, Chapter
II.]
THE STOICS[74]
WILLIAM EDWARD HARTPOLE LECKY
The Stoics asserted two cardinal principles--that virtue was the sole
legitimate object to be aspired to, and that it involved so complete an
ascendancy of the reason as altogether to extinguish the affections. The
Peripatetics and many other philosophers, who derived their opinions
chiefly from Plato, endeavoured to soften down the exaggeration of these
principles. They admitted that virtue was an object wholly distinct from
interest, and that it should be the leading motive of life; but they
maintained that happiness was also a good, and a certain regard for it
legitimate. They admitted that virtue consisted in the supremacy of the
reason over the affections, but they allowed the exercise of the latter
within restricted limits. The main distinguishing features, however, of
stoicism, the unselfish ideal and the controlling reason, were
acquiesced in, and each represents an important side of the ancient
conception of excellence which we must now proceed to examine.
In the first we may easily trace the intellectual expressio
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