res the
application of the same intellectual power which solves mathematical
problems. The common acts of life may no doubt be performed correctly by
unintellectual people, but this is because these constantly recurring
problems have been solved long ago by clever people, and the vulgar are
now in possession of the results. Whenever a new combination occurs it
is a matter for casuists; the best intentions will avail little; there
is doubtless a great difference between a good man and a bad one; the
one will do what is right when he knows it, and the other will not; but
in respect for the power of ascertaining what it is right to do,
supposing their knowledge of casuistry to be equal, they are on a par.
Goodness or the passion of humanity, or Christian love, may be a motive
inducing men to keep the law, but it has no right to be called the
law-making power. And what has Christianity added to our theoretic
knowledge of morality? It may have made men practically more moral, but
has it added anything to Aristotle's Ethics?"
Certainly Christianity has no ambition to invade the provinces of the
moralist or the casuist. But the difficulties which beset the discovery
of the right moral course are of two kinds. There are the difficulties
which arise, from the blinding and confusing effect of selfish passions,
and which obscure from the view the end which should be aimed at in
action; when these have been overcome there arises a new set of
difficulties concerning the means by which the end should be attained.
In dealing with your neighbour the first thing to be understood is that
his interest is to be considered as well as your own; but when this has
been settled, it remains to be considered what his interest is. The
latter class of difficulties requires to be dealt with by the
intellectual or calculating faculty. The former class can only be dealt
with by the moral force of sympathy. Now it is true that the right
action will not be performed without the operation of both these
agencies. But the moral agency is the dominant one throughout; it is
that without which the very conception of law is impossible; it
overcomes those difficulties which in the vast majority of practical
cases are the most serious. The calculating casuistical faculty is, as
it were, in its employ, and it is no more improper to call it the
law-making power, although it does not ultimately decide what action is
to be performed, than to say that a house was bu
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