stems of created senseless matter, put together as he thinks fit, some
degrees of sense, perception, and thought: though, as I think, I have
proved (lib. IV, ch. 10 and 14 &c.), it is no less than a contradiction
to suppose matter (which is evidently in its own nature void of sense
and thought) should be that eternal first thinking being.' Under this
view, it will be observed, mind is supposed to have the ultimate
priority, and thus to have been the original or creating cause of matter
in motion, which, in turn, becomes the cause (or, at least, the
conditional condition) of mind of a lower order. This view, however,
need not detain us, inasmuch as it can only be held by those who, on
grounds independent of philosophical thinking, already believe in mind
as the First Cause or Eternal Being: this belief granted, there is, of
course, an end of any question as between Spiritualism and Materialism.
I have, therefore, only mentioned this possible phase of spiritualistic
theory, in order to show that the theory of Materialism as applied to a
human being does not _necessarily_ involve an extension of that theory
to the cosmos. But I hold this distinction as of no practical value: it
merely indicates a logical possibility which no one would be likely to
entertain except on grounds independent of those upon which the
philosophical dispute between Spiritualism and Materialism must be
confined.

Of more practical importance is the remark already made, namely, that
the fundamental or diagnostic distinction between these two species of
theory consists _only_ in the views which they severally take on the
question of causality. This remark is of practical importance, because
in the debate between spiritualists and materialists it is often lost
sight of: nay, in some cases, it is even expressly ignored. Obviously,
when it is either intentionally or unintentionally disregarded, the
debate ceases to be directed to the question under discussion, and may
then wander aimlessly over the whole field of collateral speculation.
Throughout the present essay, therefore, the discussion will be
restricted to the only topic which we have to discuss--namely, whether
mind is the cause of motion, motion the cause of mind, or neither the
cause of the other.

The view to be first considered--namely, that mind is the cause of
motion--obviously has one great advantage over the opposite view: it
supposes the causality to proceed from that which is the sourc