rceiving it.
Or, to take another and a better illustration, in an Edison lamp the
light which is emitted from the burner may be said indifferently to be
caused by the number of vibrations per second going on in the carbon, or
by the temperature of the carbon; for this rate of vibration could not
take place in the carbon without constituting that degree of temperature
which affects our eyes as luminous. Similarly, a train of thought may be
said indifferently to be caused by brain-action or by mind-action; for,
_ex hypothesi_, the one could not take place without the other. Now when
we contemplate the phenomena of volition by themselves, it is as though
we were contemplating the phenomena of light by themselves: volition is
produced by mind in brain, just as light is produced by temperature in
carbon. And just as we may correctly speak of light as the cause, say,
of a photograph, so we may correctly speak of volition as the cause of
bodily movement. That particular kind of physical activity which takes
place in the carbon could not take place without the light which causes
a photograph; and, similarly, that particular kind of physical activity
which takes place in the brain could not take place without the volition
which causes a bodily movement. So that volition is as truly a cause of
bodily movement as is the physical activity of the brain; seeing that,
in an absolute sense, the cause is one and the same. But if we once
clearly perceive that what in a relative sense we know as volition is,
in a similar sense, the cause of bodily movement, we terminate the
question touching the freedom of the will. It thus becomes a mere matter
of phraseology whether we speak of the will determining, or being
determined by, changes going on in the external world; just as it is but
a matter of phraseology whether we speak of temperature determining, or
being determined by, molecular vibration. All the requirements alike of
the free-will and of the bond-will hypotheses are thus satisfied by a
synthesis which comprises them both. On the one hand, it would be as
impossible for an _un_conscious automaton to do the work or to perform
the adjustments of a conscious agent, as it would be for an Edison lamp
to give out light and cause a photograph when not heated by an electric
current. On the other hand, it would be as impossible for the will to
originate bodily motion without the occurrence of a strictly physical
process of cerebration, as it w
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