wn, on the one hand,
how impossible it is to attribute to Deity any of the specific
attributes of mind as known to ourselves subjectively; and, on the other
hand, how it is possible to conceive 'symbolically' that the universe
may be instinct with a 'quasi-psychical' principle, as greatly
transcending personality as personality transcends mechanical
motion[10]. Accepting, then, the world-eject in this its highest
conceivable stage of evolution, I desire to contemplate it under the
light of the monistic theory.

We have seen that, whether we look upon the subjective or objective face
of personality, we find that personality arises from limitation--or, as
I have previously termed it, circumscription. Now, we have no evidence,
nor are we able to conceive, of the external world as limited;
consequently we are not able to conceive, of the world-eject as
personal. But, inasmuch as personality arises only from limitation, the
conclusion that the world-eject is impersonal does not tend to show that
it is of lower psychical value than conscious personality: on the
contrary, it tends to show that it is probably of higher psychical
value. True, we are not able to conceive actually of mind as impersonal;
but we can see that this merely arises from our only experience of mind
being given under conditions of personality; and, as just observed, it
is possible to conceive symbolically that there may be a form of mind as
greatly transcending personality as personality transcends mechanical
motion.

Now, although we cannot conceive of such a mind actually, we may most
probably make the nearest approach to conceiving of it truly, by
_provisionally_ ascribing to it the highest attributes of mind as known
to ourselves, or the attributes which belong to human personality. Just
as a thinking insect would derive a better, or more true, conception of
human personality by considering it ejectively than by considering it
objectively (or by considering the mind-processes as distinguished from
the brain-processes), so, if there is a form of mind immeasurably
superior to our own, we may probably gain a more faithful--howsoever
still inadequate--conception of it by contemplating its operations
ejectively than by doing so objectively. I will, therefore, speak of the
world-eject as presenting conscious volition, on the understanding that
if _x_ does not present either consciousness or volition, this must
be--according to the fundamental assumption of