could only be justified by absolute knowledge.
And, on this account, I say that the doctrine of the Unknowable, in so
far as it differs from the doctrine of the Unknown, is the very reverse
of agnostic.
Now, the theory of Monism alone, as observed in the text, appears to be
purely agnostic in the sense just explained. If in some parts of the
foregoing essay I appear to have been arguing in favour of theistic
implications, this has only been in order to show (as against Clifford)
that the world does admit of being regarded as an eject. But inasmuch
as--religious faith apart--we are not able to verify any such ejective
interpretation, we are not able to estimate its value. Monism sanctions
the shading of _x_ as deeply as we choose; but the shading which it
sanctions is only provisional.]
CHAPTER V.
THE WILL IN RELATION TO MATERIALISM AND SPIRITUALISM.
In the foregoing chapters I have considered the theory of Monism, first
in contrast with the theories of Materialism and of Spiritualism, and
next in relation to the theory of Theism. In this chapter and that which
succeeds it I propose to consider Monism in relation to the Will. To do
this it is needful to begin by considering the problems which are
presented by the Will in relation to the older theories of Materialism
on the one hand and of Spiritualism on the other.
Although the phenomena of volition have occupied so large a province of
philosophical literature, the fundamental problems which arise in
connexion with them are only two in number, and both admit of being
stated in extremely simple terms. The historical order in which these
two problems have arisen is the inverse of their logical order. For
while in logical order the two problems would stand thus--Is the Will an
agent? If so, is it a free agent?--in actual discussion it was long
taken for granted that the Will is an agent, and hence the only
controversy gathered round the question whether the Will is a free
agent. Descartes, indeed, seems to have entertained the prior question
with regard to animals, and there are passages in the _Leviathan_ which
may be taken to imply that Hobbes entertained this question with regard
to man. But it was not until recent years that any such question could
stand upon a basis of science as distinguished from speculation; the
question did not admit of being so much as stated in terms of science
until physiology was in a position openly to challenge our right to
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