. To this extent,
therefore, the Will is bound--namely, by the executive capacity of the
body. But, strictly speaking, this is not a binding of the Will _qua_
Will. Even in such cases, as St. Paul says, to will may be present with
us, but how to perform that which is good we find not. I say then that
although the Will is free to will whatever it wills, nevertheless it
would fail in its essential use or object did it refuse to will in
accordance with the conditions which are imposed upon its executive
capacity. Again, to quote St. Paul, the Will might say, All things for
me are lawful; but all things are not expedient. Now, this consideration
of expediency is one of constant and far-reaching importance. For not
only, as already observed, does it lead to volition on the one hand as
rational; but it also leads to volition on the other hand as moral. Let
us take the two points separately.

Do we say that a man is not free to conduct a scientific research,
because in conducting it he must employ the needful apparatus? Or do we
say that a man is not free to marry, because in order to do so he must
go through a marriage ceremony? Obviously, to say such things would
sound very like talking nonsense. It is true that in neither case is a
man free to gain his object without adopting the means which are seen to
be necessary under the system of external causation in which he finds
himself; but this does not mean that he is not free to do as he wills,
unless it so happens that he wills to do the impossible. Thus, within
the limits that are set by the conditions of causation, a man is
understood to be free to act as he wills so long as he is not 'impeded'
by some of those conditions. To say that he is not free because he
cannot get beyond those conditions would be absurd, since, apart from
these conditions, action of any kind would be _a priori_ impossible,
and the man would have, as his only alternative, no-action.

Hence, in doing we must conform to the law of causation--which, indeed,
is all that can be meant by doing--and if in willing what we do we must
also conform to the law of causation, where is the difference with
respect to freedom? Such restraint as there may be is here a restraint
upon bodily action; not at all upon the mental action which we call
volition. The Will may will in any way that it wills to will; but the
body cannot act in every way that the Will may will it to act; therefore
the Will finds it expedient to wi