on the subject of Personality, it will be apparent that the
theory of Monism is in conflict with that of Theism only in so far as
personality appears to imply limitation. This is a point which I have
previously considered in these pages (Chapter iv, p. 109), with the
result of appearing to show that the conflict is one which would
probably vanish could we rise above the necessary limitations of human
thought. Therefore, it here seems worth while to ask, What can be said
by the philosophical theory of Monism to the old theological dilemma
touching free-will and predestination? Or, even apart from any question
of Theism, what position does Monism suppose the psychical activity of
man to hold in relation to that of the universe? Of course the latter
statement of the question is included in the former; and, therefore, we
may present it thus;--If the human will is free, and the theory of
Theism substantially true, how are we to reconcile the fact with the
theory?

According to the theory of Theism as sanctioned by Monism, what we
apprehend as natural causation is the obverse of a part of a _summum
genus_--i.e. the part falling within human observation whose whole is
the Absolute Volition. This Volition, being absolute, can nowhere meet
with restraint; it is therefore absolutely free, and can never
contradict itself. Thus, those circumscribed portions of it which we
know as human minds--and which, on account of being so circumscribed,
are free within themselves--do not in their freedom conflict with the
Absolute Volition. The Absolute Volition and the Relative Volition are
always in unison. It is not that the Absolute Volition unconditionally
determines the Relative Volition--else the Relative Volition would not
be free; but it is that the Absolute Volition invariably assents to the
Relative Volition as to the activity of an integral part of itself. This
will be at once evident if we consider that our only idea of
determination--i.e. causation--is, upon the theistic theory, derived
from our observing the consistency of the Divine Will, whether as
revealed subjectively in the causal operations of our own minds, or
objectively in the causal operations of Nature. Therefore, the idea of
causation as between the Absolute Volition and the Relative Volition is
an idea destitute of meaning. One Relative Volition may act causally on
another. Relative Volition, because each is wholly external to each. But
all Relative Volitions are co