Materialism, it is before all else desirable to be perfectly clear upon
the point of theory whereby they are essentially distinguished. This
point is that which is raised by the question whether mind is the cause
or the effect of motion. Both theories are dualistic, and therefore
agree in holding that there is causation as between mind and motion:
they differ only in their teaching as to the direction in which the
causation proceeds. Of course, out of this fundamental difference there
arise many secondary differences. The most important of these secondary
differences has reference to the nature of the eternal or self-existing
substance. Both theories agree that there is such a substance; but on
the question whether this substance be mental or material, the two
theories give contradictory answers, and logically so. For, if mind as
we directly know it (namely, in ourselves) is taken to be a cause of
motion, within our experience mind is accredited with priority; and
hence the inference that elsewhere, or universally, mind is prior to
motion. Furthermore, as motion cannot take place without something which
moves, this something is likewise supposed to have been the result of
mind: hence the doctrine of the creation by mind both of matter and of
energy. On the other hand, the theory of materialism, by refusing to
assign priority to mind as known directly in ourselves, naturally
concludes that mind is elsewhere, or universally, the result of matter
in motion--in other words, that matter in motion is the eternal or
self-existing substance, and, as such, the cause of mind wherever mind
occurs.

I may observe, in passing, that although this cosmical deduction from
the theory of materialism is, as I have said, natural, it is not (as is
the case with the corresponding deduction from the theory of
spiritualism) inevitable. For it is logically possible that even though
all known minds be the results of matter in motion, matter in motion may
nevertheless itself be the result of an unknown mind. This, indeed, is
the position virtually adopted by Locke in his celebrated controversy
with the Bishop of Worcester. Having been taken to task by this divine
for the materialistic tendency of his writings, Locke defends himself by
denying the necessary character of the deduction which we are now
considering. For example, he insists, 'I see no contradiction in it that
the first eternal thinking being should, if he pleased, give to certain
sy