House, Queenstown,
June 25, 1917.

My Dear Mr. Page:

I enclose herewith a letter on the submarine situation[61].

I think I have made it plain therein that the Allies are losing the
war; that it will be already lost when the loss of shipping reaches
the point where fully adequate supplies cannot be maintained on the
various battle fronts.

I cannot understand why our Government should hesitate to send the
necessary anti-submarine craft to this side.

There are at least seventeen more destroyers employed on our
Atlantic coast, _where there is no war_, not to mention numerous
other very useful anti-submarine craft, including sea-going tugs,
etc.

Can you not do something to bring our Government to an
understanding of how very serious the situation is? Would it not be
well to send another telegram to Mr. Lansing and the President, and
also send them the enclosed correspondence?

I am sending this by mail because I may be somewhat delayed in
returning to London.

Very sincerely yours,

Wm. S. Sims.

Page immediately acted on this suggestion.

_Most confidential for the Secretary of State and President only_

Sims sends me by special messenger from Queenstown the most
alarming reports of the submarine situation which are confirmed by
the Admiralty here. He says that the war will be won or lost in
this submarine zone within a few months. Time is of the essence of
the problem, and anti-submarine craft which cannot be assembled in
the submarine zone almost immediately may come too late. There is,
therefore, a possibility that this war may become a war between
Germany and the United States alone. Help is far more urgently and
quickly needed in this submarine zone than anywhere else in the
whole war area.

Page.

The United States had now been in the war for three months and only
twenty-eight of the sixty destroyers which were available had been sent
into the field. Yet this latest message of Page produced no effect, and,
when Admiral Sims returned from Queenstown, the two men, almost in
despair, consulted as to the step which they should take next. What was
the matter? Was it that Washington did not care to get into the naval
war with its full strength, or was it that it simply refused to believe
the representations of its Admiral and its Ambassa