dor? Admiral Sims and
Page went over the whole situation and came to the conclusion that
Washington regarded them both as so pro-British that their reports were
subject to suspicion. Just as Page had found that the State Department,
and its "trade advisers," had believed that the British were using the
blockade as a means of destroying American trade for the benefit of
Britain, so now he believed that Mr. Daniels and Admiral Benson, the
Chief of Naval Operations, evidently thought that Great Britain was
attempting to lure American warships into European waters, to undergo
the risk of protecting British commerce, while British warships were
kept safely in harbour. Page suggested that there was now only one thing
left to do, and that was to request the British Government itself to
make a statement to President Wilson that would substantiate his own
messages.

"Whatever else they think of the British in Washington," he said, "they
know one thing--and that is that a British statesman like Mr. Balfour
will not lie."

Mr. Balfour by this time had returned from America. The fact that he had
established these splendid personal relations with Mr. Wilson, and that
he had impressed the American public so deeply with his sincerity and
fine purpose, made him especially valuable for this particular appeal.
Page and Admiral Sims therefore went to the Foreign Office and laid all
the facts before him. Their own statements, Page informed the Foreign
Secretary, were evidently regarded as hysterical and biased by an
unreasoning friendliness to Great Britain. If Mr. Balfour would say the
same things over his own signature, then they would not be disbelieved.

Mr. Balfour gladly consented. He called in Admiral Jellicoe and asked
him to draft a despatch, so that all the technical facts would be
completely accurate. He also consulted with Sir Edward Carson, the First
Lord of the Admiralty. Then Mr. Balfour put the document in its final
shape and signed it. It was as follows:

_Mr. Balfour to the President_

June 30, 1917.

The forces at present at the disposal of the British Admiralty are
not adequate to protect shipping from submarine attack in the
danger zone round the British Islands. Consequently shipping is
being sunk at a greater rate than it can be replaced by new tonnage
of British origin.

The time will come when, if the present rate of loss continues, the
available shipping, apart