ade the occupation of Belgium an absolute military
necessity to the safety of the German armies advancing against France.
Otherwise they would, so far as the wit of man could divine, have left
their right flank exposed to the advance of a British army through
Belgium, and there certainly was no German commander so absolutely
bereft of all military knowledge or instinct as to have committed so
patent an error.

Belgium has Great Britain to thank for every drop of blood shed by her
people, and every franc of damage inflicted within her territory during
this war. With a million of German soldiers on her eastern border
demanding unhindered passage through one end of her territory, under the
pledge of guarding her independence and integrity and reimbursing every
franc of damage, and no British force nearer than Dover, across the
Channel, it was one of the most inconsiderate, reckless, and selfish
acts ever committed by a great power when Sir Edward Grey directed, as
is stated in No. 155 of the British "White Paper," the British Envoy in
Brussels to inform the "Belgian Government that if pressure is applied
to them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality, his
Majesty's Government expects that they will resist by any means in their
power."

It is plain enough that Great Britain was not thinking so much of
protecting Belgium as of Belgium protecting her, until she could prepare
to attack Germany in concert with Russia and France. She was willing to
let Belgium, yea almost to command Belgium, to take the fearful risk of
complete destruction in order that she might gain a little time in
perfecting the co-operation of Russia and France with herself for the
crushing of Germany, and in order to hold the public opinion of neutral
powers, especially of the United States of America, in leash under the
chivalrous issue of protecting a weaker country, which she has done
little or nothing to protect, but which she could have effectively
protected by simply remaining neutral herself.

We Americans have been greatly confused in mind in regard to the issues
of this war. We have confounded causes and occasions and purposes and
incidents until it has become almost impossible for any considerable
number of us to form a sound and correct judgment in regard to it. But
we shall emerge from that nebulous condition. We are beginning to see
more clearly now, and it would not surprise me greatly if the means used
for producing our confu