eemed, not only admissible, but quite
satisfactory.

Mr. Huelsemann states, in the course of his note, that his instructions
to address his present communication to Mr. Clayton reached Washington
about the time of the lamented death of the late President, and that he
delayed from a sense of propriety the execution of his task until the
new administration should be fully organized; "a delay which he now
rejoices at, as it has given him the opportunity of ascertaining from
the new President himself, on the occasion of the reception of the
diplomatic corps, that the fundamental policy of the United States, so
frequently proclaimed, would guide the relations of the American
government with other powers." Mr. Huelsemann also observes, that it is
in his power to assure the undersigned "that the Imperial government is
disposed to cultivate relations of friendship and good understanding
with the United States."

The President receives this assurance of the disposition of the Imperial
government with great satisfaction; and, in consideration of the
friendly relations of the two governments thus mutually recognized, and
of the peculiar nature of the incidents by which their good
understanding is supposed by Mr. Huelsemann to have been for a moment
disturbed or endangered, the President regrets that Mr. Huelsemann did
not feel himself at liberty wholly to forbear from the execution of
instructions, which were of course transmitted from Vienna without any
foresight of the state of things under which they would reach
Washington. If Mr. Huelsemann saw, in the address of the President to the
diplomatic corps, satisfactory pledges of the sentiments and the policy
of this government in regard to neutral rights and neutral duties, it
might, perhaps, have been better not to bring on a discussion of past
transactions. But the undersigned readily admits that this was a
question fit only for the consideration and decision of Mr. Huelsemann
himself; and although the President does not see that any good purpose
can be answered by reopening the inquiry into the propriety of the steps
taken by President Taylor to ascertain the probable issue of the late
civil war in Hungary, justice to his memory requires the undersigned
briefly to restate the history of those steps, and to show their
consistency with the neutral policy which has invariably guided the
government of the United States in its foreign relations, as well as
with the established and