s, the agents, were
unanimous. Even those among them who insisted on the rooted dislike of the
main body of the Boers to British authority, still thought that they were
acquiescing, exactly as the Boers in the Cape Colony had acquiesced. Could
ministers justify abandonment, without far stronger evidence than they
then possessed that they could not govern the Transvaal peaceably? Among
other things, they were assured that abandonment would be fatal to the
prospects of confederation, and might besides entail a civil war. On May
7, Sir Bartle Frere pressed the new ministers for an early announcement of
their policy, in order to prevent the mischiefs of agitation. The cabinet
decided the question on May 12, and agreed upon the terms of a
telegram(14) by which Lord Kimberley was to inform Frere that the
sovereignty of the Queen over the Transvaal could not be relinquished, but
that he hoped the speedy accomplishment of confederation would enable free
institutions to be conferred with promptitude. In other words, in spite of
all that had been defiantly said by Lord Hartington, and more cautiously
implied by Mr. Gladstone, the new government at once placed themselves
exactly in the position of the old one.(15)
The case was stated in his usual nervous language by Mr. Chamberlain a few
months later.(16) "When we came into office," (M13) he said, "we were all
agreed that the original annexation was a mistake, that it ought never to
have been made; and there arose the question could it then be undone? We
were in possession of information to the effect that the great majority of
the people of the Transvaal were reconciled to annexation; we were told
that if we reversed the decision of the late government, there would be a
great probability of civil war and anarchy; and acting upon these
representations, we decided that we could not recommend the Queen to
relinquish her sovereignty. But we assured the Boers that we would take
the earliest opportunity of granting to them the freest and most complete
local institutions compatible with the welfare of South Africa. It is easy
to be wise after the event. It is easy to see now that we were wrong in so
deciding. I frankly admit we made a mistake. Whatever the risk was, and I
believe it was a great risk, of civil war and anarchy in the Transvaal, it
was not so great a danger as that we actually incurred by maintaining the
wrong of our predecessors." Such was the language used by Mr. Chamberl
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