doning a policy deliberately adopted for what were thought powerful
and decisive reasons? "Suppose, for argument's sake," Mr. Gladstone wrote
to Lord Kimberley when the sinister news arrived (Mar. 2), "that at the
moment when Colley made the unhappy attack on Majuba Hill, there shall
turn out to have been decided on, and possibly on its way, a satisfactory
or friendly reply from the Boer government to your telegram? I fear the
chances may be against this; but if it prove to be the case, we could not
because we had failed on Sunday last, insist on shedding more blood." As
it happened, the Boer answer was decided on before the attack at Majuba,
and was sent to Colley by Kruger at Heidelberg in ignorance of the event,
the day after the ill-fated general's death. The members of the Transvaal
government set out their gratitude for the declaration that under certain
conditions the government of the Queen was inclined to cease hostilities;
and expressed their opinion that a meeting of representatives from both
sides would probably lead with all speed to a satisfactory result. This
reply was despatched by Kruger on the day on which Colley's letter of the
21st came into his hands (Feb. 28), and it reached Colley's successor on
March 7.

Sir Evelyn Wood, now after the death of Colley in chief command,
throughout recommended military action. Considering the disasters we had
sustained, he thought the happiest result would be that after a successful
battle, which he hoped to fight in about a fortnight, the Boers would
disperse without any guarantee, and many now in the field against their
will would readily settle down. He explained that by happy result, he did
not mean that a series of actions fought by any six companies could affect
our military prestige, but that a British victory would enable the Boer
(M18) leaders to quench a fire that had got beyond their control. The next
day after this recommendation to fight (March 6), he, of his own motion,
accepted a proposal telegraphed from Joubert at the instigation of the
indefatigable Brand, for a suspension of hostilities for eight days, for
the purpose of receiving Kruger's reply. There was a military reason
behind. General Wood knew that the garrison in Potchefstrom must surrender
unless the place were revictualled, and three other beleaguered garrisons
were in almost equal danger. The government at once told him that his
armistice was approved. This armistice, though Wood's reasons