ly handled with greater rashness and hurry. Gambetta had made up his
mind that the military movement was leading to the abyss, and that it must
be peremptorily arrested. It may be that he was right in supposing that
the army, which had first found its power in the time of Ismail, would go
from bad to worse. But everything turned upon the possibility of pulling
up the army, without arousing other elements more dangerous still. M.
Gambetta's impatient policy was worked out in his own head without
reference to the conditions on the scene, and the result was what might
have been expected."(51)

III

The dual control, the system of carrying on the Egyptian government under
the advice of an English and a French agent, came to an end. The rude
administration in the provinces fell to pieces. The Khedive was helplessly
involved in struggle after struggle with the military insurgents. The army
became as undisputed masters of the government, as the Cromwellian army at
some moments in our civil war. Meanwhile the British government, true to
Mr. Gladstone's constant principle, endeavoured to turn the question from
being purely Anglo-French, into an international question. The Powers were
not unfavourable, but nothing came of it. Both from Paris and from London
somewhat bewildered suggestions proceeded by way of evading the central
enigma, whether the intervention should be Turkish (M31) or Anglo-French.
It was decided at any rate to send powerful Anglo-French fleets to
Alexandria, and Mr. Gladstone only regretted that the other Powers
(including Turkey) had not been invited to have their flags represented.
To this the French objected, with the evil result that the other Powers
were displeased, and the good effect that the appearance of the Sultan in
the field might have had upon the revolutionary parties in Egypt was lost.
On May 21, 1882, M. de Freycinet went so far as to say that, though he was
still opposed to Turkish intervention, he would not regard as intervention
a case in which Turkish forces were summoned by England and France to
operate under Anglo-French control, upon conditions specified by the two
Powers. If it became advisable to land troops, recourse should be had on
these terms to Turkish troops and them only. Lord Granville acceded. He
proposed (May 24) to address the Powers, to procure international sanction
for the possible despatch of Turkish troops to Egypt. M. Freycinet
insisted that no such step was nece