t of
Egypt. Gambetta, on the other hand, was convinced that all explanations of
this sort would only serve further to inflate the enemies of France and
England in the Egyptian community, and would encourage their designs upon
the law of liquidation. Lord Granville was honourably and consistently
anxious to confine himself within the letter of international right, while
Gambetta was equally anxious to intervene in Egyptian administration,
within right or without it, and to force forward that Anglo-French
occupation in which Lord Granville so justly saw nothing but danger and
mischief. Once more Lord Granville, at the end of the month which had
opened with the Joint Note, in a despatch to the ambassador at Paris
(January 30), defined the position of the British cabinet. What measures
should be taken to meet Egyptian disorders? The Queen's government had "a
strong objection to the occupation of Egypt by themselves." Egypt and
Turkey would oppose; it would arouse the jealousy of other Powers, who
would, as there was even already good reason to believe, make counter
demonstrations; and, finally, such an occupation would be as distasteful
to the French nation as the sole occupation of Egypt by the French would
be to ourselves. Joint occupation by England and France, in short, might
lessen some difficulties, but it would seriously aggravate others. Turkish
occupation would be a great evil, but it would not entail political
dangers as great as those attending the other two courses. As for the
French objections to the farther admission of the other European Powers to
intervene in Egyptian affairs, the cabinet agreed that England and France
had an exceptional position in Egypt, but might it not be desirable to
enter into some communication with the other Powers, as to the best way of
dealing with a state of things that appeared likely to interfere both with
the Sultan's firmans and with Egypt's international engagements?
At this critical moment Gambetta fell from power. The mark that he had set
upon western policy in Egypt remained. Good observers on the spot, trained
in the great school of India, thought that even if there were no more than
a chance of working with the national party, the chance was well worth
trying. As the case was put at the time, "It is impossible to conceive a
situation that more imperatively called for caution, circumspection, and
deference to the knowledge of observers on the scene, or one that was
actual
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