were
military rather than diplomatic, virtually put a stop to suggestions for
further fighting, for it implied, and could in truth mean nothing else,
that if Kruger's reply were promising, the next step would not be a fight,
but the continuance of negotiation. Sir Evelyn Wood had not advised a
fight for the sake of restoring military prestige, but to make it easier
for the Boer leaders to break up bands that were getting beyond their
control. There was also present in his mind the intention, if the
government would sanction it, of driving the Boers out of Natal, as soon
as ever he had got his men up across the swollen river. So far from
sanctioning it, the government expressly forbade him to take offensive
action. On March 8, General Wood telegraphed home: "Do not imagine I wish
to fight. I know the attending misery too well. But now you have so many
troops coming, I recommend decisive though lenient action; and I can,
humanly speaking, promise victory. Sir G. Colley never engaged more than
six companies. I shall use twenty and two regiments of cavalry in
direction known to myself only, and undertake to enforce dispersion." This
then was General Wood's view. On the day before he sent this telegram, the
general already had received Kruger's reply to the effect that they were
anxious to negotiate, and it would be best for commissioners from the two
sides to meet. It is important to add that the government were at the same
time receiving urgent warnings from President Brand that Dutch sympathy,
both in the Cape Colony and in the Orange Free State, with the Dutch in
the Transvaal was growing dangerous, and that the prolongation of
hostilities would end in a formidable extension of their area.(27) Even in
January Lanyon had told Colley that men from the Free State were in the
field against him. Three days before Majuba, Lord Kimberley had written to
Colley (February 24), "My great fear has been lest the Free State should
take part against us, or even some movement take place in the Cape Colony.
If our willingness to come to terms has avoided such a calamity, I shall
consider it will have been a most important point gained."(28)

Two memoranda for the Queen show the views of the cabinet on the new
position of affairs:--

_To the Queen._

_March 8, 1881._--The cabinet considered with much care the terms
of the reply to Sir Evelyn Wood's telegram reporting (not
textually) the answer of the Boer leaders to t