the decision, I copy out a part of the note from
which he and I spoke:--

Objects in the Soudan which we have always deemed fit for
consideration as far as circumstances might allow:--

1. The case of those to whom Gordon held himself bound in honour.

2. The possibility of establishing an orderly government at
Khartoum.

3. Check to the slave trade.

4. The case of the garrisons.

A negative decision would probably have involved the abandonment
at a stroke of all these objects. And also (we had to consider)
whatever dangers, proximate or remote, in Egypt or in the East
might follow from the triumphant position of the Mahdi; hard to
estimate, but they may be very serious.

Two months, which have passed since the decision of the government
(Feb. 5), have thrown light, more or less, upon the several points
brought into view on the 19th February. 1. We have now no
sufficient reason to assume that any of the population of Khartoum
felt themselves bound to Gordon, or to have suffered on his
account; or even that any large numbers of men in arms perished in
the betrayal of the town, or took his part after the enemy were
admitted into it. 2. We have had no tidings of anarchy at
Khartoum, and we do not know that it is governed worse, or that
the population is suffering more, than it would be under a Turkish
or Egyptian ruler. 3. It is not believed that the possession of
Khartoum is of any great value as regards the slave trade. 4. Or,
after the failure of Gordon with respect to the garrisons, that
the possession of Khartoum would, without further and formidable
extensions of plan, avail for the purpose of relieving them. But
further, what knowledge have we that these garrisons are unable to
relieve themselves? There seems some reason to believe that the
army of Hicks, when the action ceased, fraternised with the
Mahdi's army, and that the same thing happened at Khartoum. Is
there ground to suppose that they are hateful unless as
representatives of Egyptian power? and ought they not to be
released from any obligation to present themselves in that
capacity?

With regard to the larger question of eventual consequences in
Egypt or the East from the Mahdi's success at Khartoum, it is open
to many views, and cannot be completely disposed of. But it may be
observed--