ot regard this
removal as impracticable, and was actually setting about it. Why
Gordon did not prosecute it, why we hear no more of it from Power
after Gordon's arrival, is a mystery. Instructed by results we now
perceive that Gordon's title as governor-general might naturally
be interpreted by the tribes in the light of much of the language
used by him, which did not savour of liberation and evacuation,
but of powers of government over the Soudan; powers to be used
benevolently, but still powers of government. Why the Mahdi did
not accept him is not hard to understand, but why was he not
accepted by those local sultans, whom it was the basis of his
declared policy to re-invest with their ancient powers, in spite
of Egypt and of the Mahdi alike? Was he not in short interpreted
as associated with the work of Hicks, and did he not himself give
probable colour to this interpretation? It must be borne in mind
that on other matters of the gravest importance--on the use of
Turkish force--on the use of British force--on the employment of
Zobeir--Gordon announced within a very short time contradictory
views, and never seemed to feel that there was any need of
explanation, in order to account for the contradictions. There is
every presumption, as well as every sign, that like fluctuation
and inconsistency crept into his words and acts as to the
liberation of the country; and this, if it was so, could not but
produce ruinous effects. Upon the whole, it seems probable that
Gordon, perhaps insensibly to himself, and certainly without our
concurrence, altered the character of his mission, and worked in a
considerable degree against our intentions and instructions.

There does not appear to be any question now of the security of
the army, but a most grave question whether we can demonstrate a
necessity (nothing less will suffice) for making war on a people
who are struggling against a foreign and armed yoke, not for the
rescue of our own countrymen, not for the rescue _so far as we
know_ of an Egyptian population, but with very heavy cost of
British life as well as treasure, with a serious strain on our
military resources at a most critical time, and with the most
serious fear that if we persist, we shall find ourselves engaged
in an odious work of subjugation. The discontinuance of these