, dated April 9, 1885, was prepared by Mr. Gladstone for
the cabinet_:--

The commencement of the hot season appears, with other
circumstances, to mark the time for considering at large our
position in the Soudan. Also a declaration of policy is now
demanded from us in nearly all quarters.... When the betrayal of
Khartoum had been announced, the desire and intention of the
cabinet were to reserve for a later decision the question of an
eventual advance upon that place, should no immediate movement on
it be found possible. The objects they had immediately in view
were to ascertain the fate of Gordon, to make every effort on his
behalf, and to prevent the extension of the area of disturbance.

But Lord Wolseley at once impressed upon the cabinet that he
required, in order to determine his immediate military movements,
to know whether they were to be based upon the plan of an eventual
advance on Khartoum, or whether the intention of such an advance
was to be abandoned altogether. If the first plan were adopted,
Lord Wolseley declared his power and intention to take Berber, and
even gave a possible date for it, in the middle of March. The
cabinet, adopting the phrase which Lord Wolseley had used, decided
upon the facts as they then stood before it: (_a_) Lord Wolseley
was to calculate upon proceeding to Khartoum after the hot season,
to overthrow the power of the Mahdi there; (_b_) and,
consequently, on this decision, they were to commence the
construction of a railway from Suakin to Berber, in aid of the
contemplated expedition; (_c_) an expedition was also to be sent
against Osman Digna, which would open the road to Berber; but Lord
Wolseley's demand for this expedition applied alike to each of the
two military alternatives which he had laid before the cabinet.

There was no absolute decision to proceed to Khartoum at any time;
and the declarations of ministers in parliament have treated it as
a matter to be further weighed; but all steps have thus far been
taken to prepare for it, and it has been regarded as at least
probable. In approaching the question whether we are still to
proceed on the same lines, it is necessary to refer to the motives
which under the directions of the cabinet were stated by Lord
Granville and by me, on the 19th of February, as having
contributed to