hat archangels fall infinitely short of moral
perfection, and I should only be able to see in the fact a hopeless
aggravation of my previous difficulty. If it is hard to reconcile the
supreme goodness of God with the moral turpitude of man, much more would it
be hard to do so if his very angels are depraved. Therefore, if the
reasonable question which I originally put "may be followed by a series of
similar questions to which there is no end," the goodness of God must
simply be pronounced a delusion. For the question which I originally put
was no mere flimsy question of a stupidly unreal description. My own moral
depravity is a matter of painful certainty to me, and I want to know why,
if there is a God of infinite power and goodness, he should have made me
thus. And in answer I am told that my question is "practically without
importance," because there may be an endless series of beings who, in their
several degrees, are in a similar predicament to myself. Perhaps they are;
but if so, the moral evil with which I am directly acquainted is made all
the blacker by the fact that it is thus but a drop in an infinite ocean of
moral imperfection. When, therefore, Professor Flint goes on to say, "We
ought to be content if we can show that what God has done is wise and
right, and not perplex ourselves as to why He has not done an infinity of
other things," I answer, Most certainly; but _can_ we show that what God
has done is wise and right? Unquestionably not. That what he has done _may_
be wise and right, could we see his whole scheme of things, no careful
thinker will deny; but to suppose it can be _shown_ that he has done this,
is an instance of purblind fanaticism which is most startling in a work on
_Theism_. "The best world, _we may be assured_, that our fancies can feign,
would in reality be far inferior to the world God has made, whatever
imperfections we may think we see in it." Are we leading a sermon on the
datum "God is love"? No; but a work on the questions, Is there a God? and,
if so, Is he a God of love? And yet the work is written by a man who
evidently tries to argue fairly. What shall we say of the despotism of
preformed beliefs? May we not say at least this much--that those who
endeavour to reconcile their theories of divine goodness with the facts of
human evil might well appropriate to themselves the words above quoted, "We
have neither the facts nor the faculties to answer such questions"? For the
"facts" ind
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