istence be conceded infinite, this
question is sufficiently met by the answer, "Because Existence is, and
Nothing is not." If it is retorted, But this is no real answer; I reply, It
is as real as the question. For to ask, Why is there Existence? is, upon
the supposition which has been conceded, equivalent to asking, Why is the
possible possible? And if such questions cannot be answered, it is scarcely
right to say that on this account they embody a mystery; because the
questions are really not rational questions, and therefore the fact of
their not admitting of any rational answer cannot be held to show that the
questions embody any rational mystery. That there _is_ a rational mystery,
in the sense of there being something which can never be _explained_, I do
not dispute; all I assert is, that this mystery is inexplicable, only
_because there is nothing to explain_; the mystery being ultimate, to ask
for an explanation of that which, being ultimate, requires no explanation,
is irrational. Or, to state the case in another way, if it is asked, Why is
there not Nothing? it is a sufficient answer, on supposition of the
universe being infinite, to say, Because Nothing is nothing; it is merely a
word which presents no meaning, and which, so far as anything can be
conceived to the contrary, never can present any meaning.

The above discussion has proceeded on the supposition of Existence being
infinite; but practically the same result would follow on the
counter-supposition of Existence being finite. For although in this case,
as we have seen, Non-entity would still be included within the range of
possibility, it would still be no more conceivable as such than is Entity;
and hence the question, Why is there not Nothing? would still be
irrational, seeing that, even if the possibility which the question
supposes were realised, it would in no wise tend to explain the mystery of
Something. And even if it could, the final mystery would not be thus
excluded; it would merely be transferred from the mystery of Existence to
the mystery of Non-existence. Thus under every conceivable supposition we
arrive at the same termination--viz., that in the last resort there must be
a final mystery, which, as forming the basis of all possible explanations,
cannot itself receive any explanation, and which therefore is really not,
in any proper sense of the term, a mystery at all. It is merely a fact
which itself requires no explanation, because it is