figure which fails to present this property is not a
figure to which the term "triangle" can apply. Thus viewed, however, the
illustration would obviously be absurd, for the same reason that the
question of the clown is absurd, "Can you think of a horse that is just
like a cow?" What Locke evidently means is, that we cannot conceive of any
geometrical figure which presents all the other properties of a triangle
without also presenting the property in question. Now, even admitting, with
Locke, that it is as inconceivable that the entity known to us as Matter
should possess the property of causing thought as it is that the figure
which we term a triangle should posses the property of containing more than
two right angles, still it remains, for the purposes of Locke's supposed
theistic demonstration, to prove that it is an inconceivable for the entity
which we call Mind _not_ to be due to another Mind, as it is for a triangle
_not_ to contain, other than two right angles. But, further, even if it
were possible to prove this, the demonstration would make as much against
Theism as in favour of it; for if, as the illustration of the triangle
implies, we restrict the meaning of the word "Mind" to an entity one of
whose essential qualities is that it should be caused by another Mind, the
words "Supreme and Uncaused Mind" involve a contradiction in terms, just as
much as would the words "A square triangle having four right angles." It
would, therefore, seem that if we adhere to Locke's argument, and pursue it
to its conclusion, the only logical outcome would be this:--Seeing that by
the word "Mind," I expressly connote the quality of derivation from a prior
Mind, as a quality belonging no less essentially to Mind than the quality
of presenting two right angles belongs to a triangle; therefore, whatever
other attributes I ascribe to the First Cause, I must clearly exclude the
attribute Mind; and hence, whatever else such a Cause may be, it follows
from my argument that it certainly is--Not Mind.
[9] Hamilton.
[10] Lectures on Metaphysics, vol. i. pp. 25-31.
[11] Lectures on Metaphysics, vol. ii. p. 542.
[12] _Loc. cit._, p. 543.
[13] Appendix to Discussions, pp. 614, 165.
[14] Mill, in the lengthy chapter which he devotes to the freedom of the
will in his Examination, does not notice this point.
[15] If more evidence can be wanted, it is supplied in some suggestive
facts of Psychology. For example, "From our earliest
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