utralised
by directly encountering the inconceivable relation that exists between
subject and object." Or, in other words, as before stated, "_whatever_ the
cause of Mind may be, we can clearly perceive it to be a subjective
necessity of the case that, in ultimate analysis, we should find it more
easy to conceive of this cause as resembling Mind--the only entity of which
we are directly conscious--than to conceive of it as any other entity of
which we are only indirectly conscious." When, therefore, Mr. Spencer
argues that "it is impossible to interpret inner existence in terms of
outer existence," while it is not so impossible to interpret outer
existence in terms of inner existence, the fact is merely what we should in
any case expect _a priori_ to be the fact, and therefore as a fact it is
not a very surprising discovery _a posteriori_. So that when Mr. Fiske
proceeds to make this fact the basis of his argument, that because we can
more conceivably regard objective existence as like in kind to subjective
existence than conversely, therefore we should conclude that there is a
corresponding probability in favour of the more conceivable proposition, I
demur to his argument. For, fully accepting the fact on which the argument
rests, and it seems to me, in view of what I have said, that the latter
assigns an altogether disproportionate value to the test of
inconceivability in this case. Far from endowing this test with so great an
authority in this case, I should regard it not only as perceptibly of very
small validity, but, as I have said, invalid to a degree which we have no
means of ascertaining. If it be asked, What other gauge of probability can
we have in this matter other than such a direct appeal to consciousness? I
answer, that this appeal being here _a priori_ invalid, we are left to fall
back upon the formal probability which is established by an application of
scientific canons to objective phenomena. (See footnote in Sec. 14.) For, be
it carefully observed, Mr. Spencer, and his disciple Mr. Fiske, are not
idealists. Were this the case, of course the test of an immediate appeal to
consciousness would be to them the only test available. But, on the
contrary, as all the world knows, Mr. Spencer asserts the existence of an
unknown Reality, of which all phenomena are the manifestations.
Consequently, what we call Force and Matter are, according to this
doctrine, phenomenal manifestations of this objective Reality. Th
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