facts of the cosmos; and if these facts admit of
being explained by the action of a single causative principle inherent in
the cosmos itself, teleology is not free to assume the action of any
causative principle of a more ultimate character. Still, as I have
repeatedly insisted, these considerations do not entitle us dogmatically to
deny the existence of some such more ultimate principle; all that these
considerations do is to remove any rational argument from teleological
sources that any such more ultimate principle exists. Therefore I am, of
course, quite at one with Professor Flint when he says Professor Huxley
"admits that the most thoroughgoing evolutionist must at least assume 'a
primordial molecular arrangement of which all the phenomena of the universe
are the consequences,' and 'is thereby at the mercy of the theologist, who
can defy him to disprove that this primordial molecular arrangement was not
intended to involve the phenomena of the universe.' Granting this much, he
is logically bound to grant more. If the entire evolution of the universe
may have been intended, the several stages of its evolution may have been
intended, and they may have been intended for their own sakes as well as
for the sake of the collective evolution or its final result." Now that
such _may have been_ the case, I have been careful to insist in Chapter V.;
all I am now concerned with is to show that, in view of the considerations
adduced in Chapter IV., there is no longer any evidence to prove, or even
to indicate, that such _has been_ the case. And with reference to this
opportune quotation from Professor Huxley I may remark, that the
"thoroughgoing evolutionist" is now no longer "at the mercy of the
theologian" to any further extent than that of not being able to disprove a
purely metaphysical hypothesis, which is as certainly superfluous, in any
scientific sense, as the fundamental data of science are certainly true.

It may seem almost unnecessary to extend this postscript by pursuing
further the criticism on Professor Flint's exposition in the light of "a
single new reason ... for the denial of design" which he challenges; but
there are nevertheless one or two other points which it seems desirable to
consider. Professor Flint writes:--

"M. Comte imagines that he has shown the inference from design, from the
order and stability of the solar system, to be unwarranted, when he has
pointed out the physical conditions through which