ich our imaginary theist was not blind. How then did he meet it? He met
it by the considerations--1st. That the scientific train of reasoning
evolved this conclusion only by employing, in a wholly unrestricted manner,
"symbolic conceptions of the illegitimate order;" and, 2d. That when the
conclusion thus illegitimately evolved was directly confronted with the
fact of cosmic harmony which it professes to explain, he found it to be
beyond the powers of human thought to conceive of such an effect as due to
such a cause. Now, as already observed, I consider these strictures on the
scientific train of reasoning to be thoroughly valid. There can be no
question that the highly symbolic character of the conceptions which that
train of reasoning is compelled to adopt, is a source of serious weakness
to the conclusions which it ultimately evolves; while there can, I think,
be equally little doubt that there does not live a human being who would
venture honestly to affirm, that he can really conceive the fact of cosmic
harmony as exclusively due to the causes which the scientific train of
reasoning assigns. But freely conceding this much, and an atheist may
reply, that although the objections of his antagonist against this symbolic
method of reasoning are undoubtedly valid, yet, from the nature of the
case, this is the only method of scientific reasoning which is available.
If, therefore, he expresses his obligations to his antagonist for pointing
out a source of weakness in this method of reasoning--a source of weakness,
be it observed, which renders it impossible for him to estimate the actual,
as distinguished from the apparent, probability of the conclusion
attained--this is all that he can be expected to do: he cannot be expected
to abandon the only scientific method of reasoning available, in favour of
a metaphysical method which only escapes the charge of symbolism by leaping
with a single bound from a known cause (human intelligence) to the
inference of an unknowable cause (Divine Intelligence). For the atheist may
well point out that, however objectionable his scientific method of
reasoning may be on account of the symbolism which it involves, it must at
any rate be preferable to the metaphysical method, in that its symbols
throughout refer to known causes.[27] With regard, then, to this stricture
on the scientific method of reasoning, I conclude that although the caveat
which it contains should never be lost sight of by ath