at which it is applied. This, indeed, we saw to be the case even
with the test of absolute inconceivability (see Chapter V.), but much more
must it be the case with this test of relative inconceivability. For,
without comment, it is manifest that our acquired sense of probability, as
distinguished from our innate sense of possibility, with regard to any
particular question of a transcendental nature, cannot be at all comparable
with its value in the case of ordinary questions, with respect to which our
sense of probability is being always rectified by external facts. Although,
therefore, it is true that both those who reject and those who retain a
belief in Theism on grounds of relative conceivability are equally entitled
to be regarded as displaying a rational attitude of mind, in whatever
degree either party considers their belief as of a higher validity than the
grounds of psychology from which it takes its rise, in that degree must the
members of that party be deemed irrational. In other words, not only must a
man be careful not to confuse the test of relative inconceivability with
that of absolute conceivability--not to suppose that his sense of
probability in this matter is determined by an innate psychological
inability to conceive a proposition, when in reality it is only determined
by the difficulty of dissociating ideas which have long been habitually
associated;--but he must also be careful to remember that the test of
relative inconceivability in this matter is only valid as justifying a
belief of the most diffident possible kind.

And from this the practical deduction is--tolerance. Let no man think that
he has any argumentative right to expect that the mere subjective habit or
tone of his own mind should exert any influence on that of his fellow; but
rather let him always remember that the only legitimate weapons of his
intellectual warfare are those the _material_ of which is derived from the
external world, and only the _form_ of which is due to the forging process
of his own mind. And if in battle such weapons seem to be unduly blunted on
the hardened armoury of traditional beliefs, or on the no less hardened
armoury of confirmed scepticism, let him remember further that he must not
too confidently infer that the fault does not lie in the character of his
own weapons. To drop the figure, let none of us forget in how much need we
all stand of this caution:--Knowing how greatly the value of arguments is
af