fected, even to the most impartial among us, by the frame of mind in
which we regard them, let all of us be jealously careful not to
over-estimate the certainty that our frame or habit of mind is actually
superior to that of our neighbour. And, in conclusion, it is surely
needless to insist on the yet greater need there is for most of us to bear
in mind this further caution:--Knowing with what great subjective
opposition arguments are met when they conflict with our established modes
of thought, let us all be jealously careful to guard the sanctuary of our
judgment from the polluting tyranny of habit.

* * * * *

CHAPTER VII.

GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.

Sec. 48. Our analysis is now at an end, and a very few words will here suffice
to convey an epitomised recollection of the numerous facts and conclusions
which we have found it necessary to contemplate. We first disposed of the
conspicuously absurd supposition that the origin of things, or the mystery
of existence, admits of being explained by the theory of Theism in any
further degree than by the theory of Atheism. Next it was shown that the
argument "Our heart requires a God" is invalid, seeing that such a
subjective necessity, even if made out, could not be sufficient to
prove--or even to render probable--an objective existence. And with regard
to the further argument that the fact of our theistic aspirations point to
God as to their explanatory cause, it became necessary to observe that the
argument could only be admissible after the possibility of the operation of
natural causes had been excluded. Similarly the argument from the supposed
intuitive necessity of individual thought was found to be untenable, first,
because, even if the supposed necessity were a real one, it would only
possess an individual applicability; and second, that, as a matter of fact,
it is extremely improbable that the supposed necessity is a real necessity
even for the individual who asserts it, while it is absolutely certain that
it is not such to the vast majority of the race. The argument from the
general consent of mankind, being so obviously fallacious both as to facts
and principles, was passed over without comment; while the argument from a
first cause was found to involve a logical suicide. Lastly, the argument
that, as human volition is a cause in nature, therefore all causation is
probably volitional in character, was shown to consist in a s