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eivable should be so, and that the Conceivably Probable should exist than that the Conceivably Improbable should do so: in neither case, however, can we know _what degree_ of such likelihood is present. Sec. 41. From the foregoing considerations, then, it would appear that the only attitude which in strict logic it is admissible to adopt towards the question concerning the being of a God is that of "suspended judgment." Formally speaking, it is alike illegitimate to affirm or to deny Intelligence as an attribute of the Ultimate. And here I would desire it to be observed, that this is the attitude which the majority of scientifically-trained philosophers actually have adopted with regard to this matter. I am not aware, however, that any one has yet endeavoured to formulate the justification of this attitude; and as I think there can be no doubt that the above presentation contains in a logical shape the whole of such justification, I cannot but think that some important ends will have been secured by it. For we are here in possession, not merely of a vague and general impression that the Ultimate is super-scientific, and so beyond the range of legitimate prediction; but we are also in possession of a logical formula whereby at once to vindicate the rationality of our opinion, and to measure the precise degree of its technical value. * * * * * CHAPTER VI. THE ARGUMENT FROM METAPHYSICAL TELEOLOGY. Sec. 42. Let us now proceed to examine the effect of the formal considerations which have been adduced in the last chapter on the scientific considerations which were dealt with in the previous chapters. In these previous chapters the proposition was clearly established that, just as certainly as the fundamental data of science are true, so certainly is it true that the theory of Theism in any shape is, scientifically considered, superfluous; for these chapters have clearly shown that, if there is a God, his existence, considered as a cause of things, is as certainly unnecessary as it is certainly true that force is persistent and that matter is indestructible. But after this proposition had been carefully justified, it remained to show that the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge compelled us to carry our discussion into a region of yet higher abstraction. For although we observed that the essential qualities of matter and of force are the most ultimate data of human knowledge, and a
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