e
absurd. We cannot conceive of a case where a party could vote without
knowledge of the fact of voting, and to apply the term "knowingly" to
the more act of voting, would make nonsense of the statute. This word
was inserted as defining the essence of the offence, and it limits the
criminality to cases where the voting is not only without right, but
where it is done wilfully, with a _knowledge that it is without right_.
Short of that there is no offence within the statute. This would be so
upon well established principles, even if the word "knowingly" had been
omitted, but that word was inserted to prevent the possibility of doubt
on the subject, and to furnish security against the inability of stupid
or prejudiced judges or jurors, to distinguish between wilful wrong and
innocent mistake. If the statute had been merely, that "if at any
election for representative in Congress any person shall vote without
having a lawful right to vote, such person shall be deemed guilty of a
crime," there could have been justly no conviction under it, without
proof that the party voted _knowing_ that he had not a right to vote. If
he voted innocently supposing he had the right to vote, but had not, it
would not be an offence within the statute. An innocent mistake is not a
crime, and no amount of judicial decisions can make it such.

Mr. Bishop says, (1 Cr. Law, Sec.205): "There can be no crime unless _a
culpable intent_ accompanies the criminal act." The same author, (1 Cr.
Prac. Sec.521), repeated in other words, the same idea: "In order to
render a party criminally responsible, _a vicious will_ must concur with
a wrongful act."

I quote from a more distinguished author: "_Felony is always accompanied
with an evil intention, and therefore shall not be imputed to a mere
mistake, or misanimadversion_, as where persons break open a door, in
order to execute a warrant, which will not justify such proceeding:
_Affectio enim tua nomen imponit operi tuo: item crimen non contrahitur
nisi nocendi, voluntas intercedat_," which, as I understand, may read:
"For your volition puts the name upon your act; and _a crime is not
committed unless the will of the offender takes part in it_."

1 Hawk. P.C., p. 99, Ch. 85, Sec.3.

This quotation by Hawkins is, I believe, from Bracton, which carries the
principle back to a very early period in the existence of the common
law. It is a principle, however, which underlies all law, and must have
b