wn which should exclude them
from higher offices, and which marks the line between those which they
may and those which they may not hold.

Another objection is that women cannot serve as soldiers. To this I
answer that capacity for military service has never been made a test of
the right to vote. If it were, young men from sixteen to twenty-one
would be entitled to vote, and old men from sixty and up-wards would
not. If that were the test, some women would present much stronger
claims than many of the male sex.

Another objection is that engaging in political controversies is not
consistent with the feminine character. Upon that subject, women
themselves are the best judges, and if political duties should be found
inconsistent with female delicacy, we may rest assured that women will
either effect a change in the character of political contests, or
decline to engage in them. This subject may be safely left to their
sense of delicacy and propriety.

If any difficulty on this account should occur, it may not be impossible
to receive the votes of women at their places of residence. This method
of voting was practiced in ancient Rome under the republic; and it will
be remembered that when the votes of the soldiers who were fighting our
battles in the Southern States were needed to sustain their friends at
home, no difficulty was found in the way of taking their votes at their
respective camps.

I humbly submit to your honor, therefore, that on the constitutional
grounds to which I have referred, Miss Anthony had a lawful right to
vote; that her vote was properly received and counted; that the first
section of the fourteenth amendment secured to her that right, and did
not need the aid of any further legislation.

But conceding that I may be in error in supposing that Miss Anthony had
a right to vote, she has been guilty of no crime, if she voted in good
faith believing that she had such right.

This proposition appears to me so obvious, that were it not for the
severity to my client of the consequences which may follow a conviction,
I should not deem it necessary to discuss it.

To make out the offence, it is incumbent on the prosecution to show
affirmatively, not only that the defendant knowingly voted, but that she
so voted _knowing that she had no right to vote_. That is, the term
"knowingly," applies, not to the fact of voting, but to the fact of
_want of right_. Any other interpretation of the language would b