hat such
regulations were unjust, tyrannical, unfit for the regulation of an
intelligent State; but if rights of a citizen are thereby violated, they
are of that fundamental class derived from his position as a citizen of
the State, and not those limited rights belonging to him as a citizen of
the United States, and such was the decision in _Corfield agt. Coryell_.
(Supra.) The United States rights appertaining to this subject are those
first under article I, paragraph 2, of the United States Constitution,
which provides that electors of Representatives in Congress shall have
the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of
the State Legislature, and second, under the 15th Amendment, which
provides that the right of a citizen of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States, or by any State, on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. If the
Legislature of the State of New York should require a higher
qualification in a voter for a representative in Congress than is
required for a voter for a Member of Assembly, this would, I conceive,
be a violation of a right belonging to one as a citizen of the United
States. That right is in relation to a Federal subject or interest, and
is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. The inability of a State to
abridge the right of voting on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude, arises from a Federal guaranty. Its violation
would be the denial of a Federal right--that is a right belonging to the
claimant as a citizen of the United States.
This right, however, exists by virtue of the 15th Amendment. If the 15th
Amendment had contained the word "sex," the argument of the defendant
would have been potent. She would have said, an attempt by a State to
deny the right to vote because one is of a particular sex, is expressly
prohibited by that Amendment. The amendment, however, does not contain
that word. It is limited to race, color, or previous condition of
servitude. The Legislature of the State of New York has seen fit to say,
that the franchise of voting shall be limited to the male sex. In saying
this, there is, in my judgment, no violation of the letter or of the
spirit of the 14th or of the 15th Amendment. This view is assumed in the
second section of the 14th Amendment, which enacts that if the right to
vote for Federal officers is denied by any state to any of the male
inhabitants of su
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