me should have an actual knowledge of a certain law which forbids the
act, but he must have a criminal intent. Thus, if one is charged with
theft, and admits the taking of the property, which is clearly proved to
have belonged to another, it is yet a good defence that he really
believed that he had a right to take it, or that he took it by mistake.
Just so in a case where, as sometimes occurs, the laws regulating the
right to vote in a State are of doubtful meaning, and a voter is
uncertain whether he has a right to vote in one town or another, and,
upon taking advice from good counsel, honestly makes up his mind that he
has a right to vote in the town of A. In this belief he applies to the
registrars of that town, who upon the statement of the facts, are of the
opinion that he has a right to vote there, and place his name upon the
list, and on election day he votes there without objection. Now, if he
should be prosecuted for illegal voting, it would not be enough that he
acknowledged the fact of voting, and that the judge was of the opinion
that his view of the law was wrong. There would remain another and most
vital question in the case, and that is, did he intend to vote
unlawfully? Now, precisely the wrong that would be done to the voter in
the case we are supposing, by the judge ordering a verdict of guilty to
be entered up, was done by that course in Miss Anthony's case. She
thoroughly believed that she had a right to vote. In addition to this
she had consulted one of the ablest lawyers in Western New York, who
gave it as his opinion that she had a right to vote, and who testified
on the trial that he had given her that advice. The Act of Congress upon
which the prosecution was founded uses the term "knowingly,"--"shall
knowingly vote or attempt to vote in the name of any other person, or
more than once at the same election for any candidate for the same
office, or vote at a place where he may not be lawfully entitled to
vote, or without having a lawful right to vote." Here most manifestly
the term "knowingly" does not apply to the mere _act_ of voting. It is
hardly possible that a man should vote, and not know the fact that he
is voting. The statute will bear no possible construction but that which
makes the term "knowingly" apply to the _illegality_ of the act. Thus,
"shall knowingly vote without having a lawful right to vote," can only
mean, shall vote knowing that there is no lawful right to vote. This
being so,