there was manifestly a most vital question beyond that of the
fact of voting, and of the conclusion of the judge that the voting was
illegal, viz., did Miss Anthony vote, knowing that she had no right to
vote.

Now, many people will say that Miss Anthony ought to have known that she
had no right to vote, and will perhaps regard it as an audacious attempt
for mere effect, to assert a right that she might think she ought to
have, but could not really have believed that she had. But whatever
degree of credit her claim to have acted honestly in the matter is
entitled to, whether to much, or little, or none, it was entirely a
question for the jury, and they alone could pass upon it. The judge had
no right even to express an opinion on the subject to the jury, much
less to instruct them upon it, and least of all to order a verdict of
guilty without consulting them.

There seems to have been an impression, as the writer infers from
various notices of the matter in the public papers, that the case had
resolved itself into a pure question of law. Thus, a legal correspondent
of one of our leading religious papers, in defending the course of Judge
Hunt, says: "There was nothing before the Court but a pure question of
law. Miss Anthony violated the law of the State intentionally and
deliberately, as she openly avowed, and when brought to trial her only
defence was that the law was unconstitutional. Here was nothing whatever
to go to the jury." And again he says: "In jury trials all questions of
law are decided by the judge." This writer is referred to only as
expressing what are supposed to be the views of many others.

To show, however, how entirely incorrect is this assumption of fact, I
insert here the written points submitted by Miss Anthony's counsel to
the Court, for its instruction to the jury.

First--That if the defendant, at the time of voting, believed that she
had a right to vote, and voted in good faith in that belief, she is not
guilty of the offence charged.

Second--In determining the question whether she did or did not believe
that she had a right to vote, the jury may take into consideration, as
bearing upon that question, the advice which she received from the
counsel to whom she applied.

Third--That they may also take into consideration, as bearing upon the
same question, the fact that the inspectors considered the question, and
came to the conclusion that she had a right to vote.

Fourth--That the jur