ich
centered round his own goal--the establishment, if not of a league of
nations cemented by brotherhood and fellowship, at least of the nearest
approach to that which he could secure, even though it fell far short of
the original design. These were the first-fruits of the interweaving of
the Covenant with the Treaty.

In view of this readiness to split differences and sacrifice principles
to expediency it became impossible even to the least observant of Mr.
Wilson's adherents in the Old World to cling any longer to the belief
that his cosmic policy was inspired by firm intellectual attachment to
the sublime ideas of which he had made himself the eloquent exponent and
had been expected to make himself the uncompromising champion. In every
such surrender to the Great Powers, as in every stern enforcement of his
principles on the lesser states, the same practical spirit of the
professional politician visibly asserted itself. One can hardly acquit
him of having lacked the moral courage to disregard the veto of
interested statesmen and governments and to appeal directly to the
peoples when the consequence of this attitude would have been the
sacrifice of the makeshift of a Covenant which he was ultimately content
to accept as a substitute for the complete reinstatement of nations in
their rights and dignity.

The general tendency of the labors of the Conference then was shaped by
those two practical maxims, the immunity of the Anglo-Saxon peoples and
of their French ally from the restrictions to be imposed by the new
politico-social ordering in so far as these ran counter to their
national interests, and the determination of the American President to
get and accept such a league of nations as was feasible under extremely
inauspicious conditions and to content himself with that.

To this estimate exception may be taken on the ground that it underrates
an effort which, however insufficient, was well meant and did at any
rate point the way to a just resettlement of secular problems which the
war had made pressing and that it fails to take account of the
formidable obstacles encountered. The answer is, that like efforts had
proceeded more than once before from rulers of men whose will, seeing
that they were credited with possessing the requisite power, was assumed
to be adequate to the accomplishment of their aim, and that they had led
to nothing. The two Tsars, Alexander I at the Congress of Vienna, and
Nicholas II at the