ust return to Washington as the champion of a
manifestly lost cause. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that his
thesis was not destitute of arguments to support it. Accordingly the
deadlock went on for months, until the Italian Cabinet fell and people
wearied of the Adriatic problems.
Poland was another of the communities which had to bend before
Anglo-Saxon will, represented in her case mainly by Mr. Lloyd George,
not, however, without the somewhat tardy backing of his colleague from
Washington. It is important for the historian and the political student
to observe that as the British Premier was not credited with any
profound or original ideas about the severing or soldering of east
European territories, the authorship of the powerful and successful
opposition to the allotting of Dantzig to Poland was rightly or wrongly
ascribed not to him, but to what is euphemistically termed
"international finance" lurking in the background, whose interest in
Poland was obviously keen, and whose influence on the Supreme Council,
although less obvious, was believed to be far-reaching. The same
explanation was currently suggested for the fixed resolve of Mr. Lloyd
George not to assign Upper Silesia to Poland without a plebiscite. His
own account of the matter was that although the inhabitants were
Polish--they are as two to one compared with the Germans--it was
conceivable that they entertained leanings toward the Germans, and might
therefore desire to throw in their lot with these. When one compares
this scrupulous respect for the likes and dislikes of the inhabitants of
that province with the curt refusal of the same men at first to give ear
to the ardent desire of the Austrians to unite with the Germans, or to
abide by a plebiscite of the inhabitants of Fiume or Teschen, one is
bewildered. The British Premier's wish was opposed by the official body
of experts appointed to report on the matter. Its members had no
misgivings. The territory, they said, belonged of right to Poland, the
great majority of its population was unquestionably Polish, and the
practical conclusion was that it should be handed over to the Polish
government as soon as feasible. Thereupon the staff of the commission
was changed and new members were substituted for the old.[130] But that
was not enough. The British Premier still encountered such opposition
among his foreign colleagues that it was only by dint of wordy warfare
and stubbornness that he finall
|