old that there would be one. Mr. Wilson, who was in England at the
time, answered him in a speech declaring that the United States would
enter into no alliance which did not include all the world: "no
combination of power which is not a combination of all of us." Well,
since then he became a party to a kind of triple alliance and in the
judgment of many observers it constitutes the main result of the
Conference. In the words of an American press organ: "Clemenceau got
virtually everything he asked. President Wilson virtually dropped his
own program, and adopted the French and British, both of them
imperialistic."[116]

Again, when the first commission of experts reported upon the frontiers
of Poland, the British Premier objected to a section of the "corridor,"
on the ground that as certain districts contained a majority of Germans
their annexation would be a danger to the future peace and therefore to
Poland herself, and also on the ground that it would run counter to one
of Mr. Wilson's fundamental points; the President, who at that time
dissented from Mr. Lloyd George, rose and remarked that his principles
must not be construed too literally. "When I said that Poland must be
restored, I meant that everything indispensable to her restoration must
be accorded. Therefore, if that should involve the incorporation of a
number of Germans in Polish territory, it cannot be helped, for it is
part of the restoration. Poland must have access to the sea by the
shortest route, and everything else which that implies." None the less,
the British Premier, whose attitude toward the claims of the Poles was
marked by a degree of definiteness and persistency which could hardly be
anticipated in one who had never even heard of Teschen before the year
1919, maintained his objections with emphasis and insistence, until Mr.
Wilson and M. Clemenceau gave in.

Or take the President's way of dealing with the non-belligerent states.
Before leaving Paris for Washington, Mr. Wilson, officially questioned
by one of his colleagues at an official sitting as to whether the
neutrals would also sign the Covenant, replied that only the Allies
would be admitted to affix their signatures. "Don't you think it would
be more conducive to the firm establishment of the League if the
neutrals were also made parties to it now?" insisted the
plenipotentiary. "No, I do not," answered the President. "I think that
it would be conferring too much honor on them, and t