this experiment, we cannot help recognising that it was
a precocious, an unripe imperialism. For us it was too early to secure
Asiatic islands; too early {54} to worry about American investments in
foreign lands. It was an imperialism carried out somnambulistically.
Our taking the Philippines was an accident, unforeseen and
undesired.[6] Our hope of being the work-shop and banking centre of
the world, of being the heart of a great empire like that of Britain,
and of doing all this within a short period, was a dream, which
vanished with the new demands made upon American capital by an
increasing economic expansion.

The truth is that this unripe imperialism did not represent the
interests of the majority nor even of any considerable group of our
capital owners. It was doomed to disappearance once the revival of
American industry offered opportunities, not only for the ordinary
capitalist, but for that more speculative investor, who in other
countries clamours for imperialism. The experiment revealed, however,
that the same forces which act upon capital in Europe act also upon
capital in America, and that the United States, given the right
conditions, is liable to the same ambitions as are imperialistic
countries and is as likely to engage in war to satisfy these ambitions.
The imperialistic trend acts upon all nations at a given stage in their
economic development. It cannot be stopped by traditions of
peacefulness or by mere protestations, however sincere. It is a part
of the great economic strife, out of which devastating wars arise.

[1] "Early in the year 1901, a foreign ambassador at Washington
remarked in the course of a conversation that, although he had been in
America only a short time, he had seen two different countries, the
United States before the war with Spain, and the United States since
the war with Spain. This was a picturesque way of expressing the
truth, now generally accepted, that the war of 1898 was a turning point
in the history of the American republic."--"The United States as a
World Power," by Archibald Gary Coolidge. New York, 1912.

[2] For a study of these strategic considerations see "The Interest of
America in Sea Power, Present and Future," by Captain (later
Rear-Admiral) A. T. Mahan, a series of articles written between 1890
and 1897. Boston, 1911.

[3] John A. Hobson, "Imperialism," p. 23. London, 1902.

[4] _Op. cit._, p. 83.

[5] In 1914, twenty-six years after