e purchases. More important
was the complex of financial interests, likely to be created in Latin
America and elsewhere. Speculators were dreaming of great foreign
investments for American capital. We were to become a creditor nation,
an imperialistic power, exploiting the backward countries of the globe.
We were to participate in international loans, more or less forced, and
to make money wherever the flag flew. For such a policy there was
needed the backing of a patriotic, united, disciplined and armed
nation, and to secure such arms, any excuse would suffice.

At the most, of course, these financial adventurers were merely leaders
in a movement that arose out of the peculiar conditions of the moment.
The roots of our sudden desire for armament and for an aggressive
foreign policy ran far deeper than the interests of any particular
financial group. A sense that American ideals were in peril of being
destroyed by a new barbarism impelled us to new efforts. We dimly
perceived that we must solve new problems, accept new responsibilities,
and acquit ourselves worthily in new crises.

The most obvious result of this campaign for preparedness was a largely
increased expenditure for armies and navies. Its deeper significance,
however, lay in the fact that it marked the end of our former theory
that war can be ended by precept and example and that no nation need
fear war or prepare for war so long as its intentions are good.
Hereafter the size and character of our national armament was to be
determined in relation to the possibility of war with Europe and of war
in Europe. The {10} campaign for military preparation is not ended.
It will not end until some relation is established between our new
armament and the national policy which that armament is to serve.

So long as these preparedness debates lasted we believed that the
fundamental cleavage in American sentiment was between those who wished
to arm and those who did not. Yet the proposal to increase the army
and navy was defended by men of varying temperaments and opinions, by
liberals and conservatives, by workmen and capitalists, by members of
peace societies and representatives of the Navy League. As the first
stage of mere instinctive arming passes, however, it suddenly appears
as though the true cleavage in American thought and feeling runs
perpendicular to the division between those who favour and those who
oppose armament. The real issue is the purpose