m the
necessity of a united nation. They wanted "Americanism," pure, simple,
undiluted, straight. There was to be no hyphen, no cleavage between
racial stocks, no line between sections or social classes. America was
to be racially, linguistically, sectionally one.

It was an ideal, good or bad, according to its {8} interpretation. A
more definitely integrated America, with a concrete forward-looking
internal and foreign policy, could aid disinterestedly in untying the
European tangle. In the main, however, the demand for Americanism took
on an aggressive, jingoistic, red-white-and-blue tinge. Out of it
arose an exaggerated change of mood toward the "hyphenate," the
American of foreign, and especially German, lineage. Newspapers teemed
with attacks upon this man of divided allegiance.

In other ways our agitation for a United America took a reactionary
shape. Though a pacific nation, we experienced a sudden revulsion
against pacifism and Hague tribunals, as though it were the pacifists
who had brought on the war. Contempt was expressed for our
industrialism, our many-tongued democracy, our policy of diplomatic
independence. Those most opposed to Prussianism, as it has been
defined, were most stubbornly Prussian in their proposals. We heard
praises of the supreme education of the German barracks, and a clamour
arose for universal service, not primarily industrial or educational
but military in character. A decaying patriotism of Americans was
deplored quite in the manner of Bernhardi. More than ever there was
talk of national honour, prestige, the rights of America. Our former
attitude of abstention from European disputes was called "provincial,"
and we were urged to fight for all manner of reasons and causes. Even
though we cravenly desired peace, we were to have no choice. An
impoverished Germany, beaten to her knees, was to pay her indemnity by
landing an army in New York and holding that city for ransom. Around
such futilities did many American minds play.

All this appeal would have been more convincing had it not been most
insistently urged by influential financial groups. The extent of
certain financial interests in large {9} armaments, in a spirited
foreign policy and in other widely advertised new doctrines, was
obvious. The war had built up a vast armament industry, war stocks had
been widely distributed, and upon the advent of peace these properties
would shrink in value unless America mad