according to our present reckoning, in order
that the moon might have sufficient northing, and that involves a year
beginning after April 1; so that the year of the battle of Beth-horon
must have been an ordinary year, one of twelve months, but must have
followed a year of thirteen months.

Summarizing all the conclusions at which we have now arrived, Joshua's
observation was made at Gibeon itself, almost precisely at the moment of
noon, on or about the 21st day of the fourth month, which day fell late
in July according to our present reckoning; probably on or about the
22nd. The sun's declination must have been about 20 deg. north; probably, if
anything, a little more. The sun rose therefore almost exactly at five
in the morning, and set almost exactly at seven in the evening, the day
being just fourteen hours long. The moon had not yet passed her third
quarter, but was very near it; that is to say, she was about half full.
Her declination did not differ greatly from 16 deg. north; she was probably
about 5 deg. above the horizon, and was due to set in about half an hour.
She had risen soon after eleven o'clock the previous evening, and had
lighted the Israelites during more than half of their night march up
from Gilgal.

4.--JOSHUA'S STRATEGY

These conclusions, as to the place and time of day, entirely sweep away
the impression, so often formed, that Joshua's victory was practically
in the nature of a night surprise. Had it been so, and had the Amorites
been put to flight at daybreak, there would have seemed no conceivable
reason why, with fourteen hours of daylight before him, Joshua should
have been filled with anxiety for the day to have been prolonged. Nor is
it possible to conceive that he would still have been at Gibeon at noon,
seven hours after he had made his victorious attack upon his enemy.

The fact is that, in all probability, Joshua had no wish to make a
night surprise. His attitude was like that of Nelson before the battle
of Trafalgar; he had not the slightest doubt but that he would gain the
victory, but he was most anxious that it should be a complete one. The
great difficulty in the campaign which lay before him was the number of
fortified places in the hands of the enemy, and the costliness, both in
time and lives, of all siege operations at that epoch. His enemies
having taken the field gave him the prospect of overcoming this
difficulty, if, now that they were in the open, he could succeed