n, and when firmly established, to challenge the Amorites to
attack them. Then, when the Israelite general in command at Beeroth
perceived that he had before him practically the whole Amorite
force--for it would seem clear that the five kings themselves, together
with the greater part of their army, were thus drawn away--he would
signal to Joshua that the time had come for his advance. Just as Joshua
himself had signalled with his spear at the taking of Ai, so the firing
of a beacon placed on the summit of the ridge would suffice for the
purpose. Joshua would then lead up the main body, seize the Jerusalem
road, and press on to Gibeon at the utmost speed. If this were so, the
small detachment of Amorites left to continue the blockade was speedily
crushed, but perhaps was aware of Joshua's approach soon enough to send
swift runners urging the five kings to return. The news would brook no
delay; the kings would turn south immediately; but for all their haste
they never reached Gibeon. They probably had but advanced as far as the
ridge leading to Beth-horon, when they perceived that not only had
Joshua relieved Gibeon and destroyed the force which they had left
before it, but that his line, stretched out far to the right and left,
already cut them off, not merely from the road to Jerusalem and Hebron,
but also from the valley of Ajalon, a shorter road to the Maritime Plain
than the one they actually took. East there was no escape; north was the
Israelite army from Beeroth; south and west was the army of Joshua.
Out-manoeuvred and out-generalled, they were in the most imminent danger
of being caught between the two Israelite armies, and of being ground,
like wheat, between the upper and nether millstones. They had no heart
for further fight; the promise made to Joshua,--"there shall not a man
of them stand before thee,"--was fulfilled; they broke and fled by the
one way open to them, the way of the two Beth-horons.

Whilst this conjectural strategy attributes to Joshua a ready grasp of
the essential features of the military position and skill in dealing
with them, it certainly does not attribute to him any greater skill than
it is reasonable to suppose he possessed. The Hebrews have repeatedly
proved, not merely their valour in battle, but their mastery of the art
of war, and, as Marcel Dieulafoy has recently shown,[372:1] the earliest
general of whom we have record as introducing turning tactics in the
field, is David in th