ed with arrangements that were already in
full working order, or that they ignored the existence of formations
which only stood in need of nursing and of consolidation to render
them really valuable assets within a short space of time for the
purpose of prosecuting war. The masterful personality and
self-confidence to which the phenomenal success that attended his
creation of the wonderful New Armies was so largely due, was in some
respects a handicap to him in the early days of his stewardship.
My impression of him--an impression unduly influenced perhaps by
personal experiences--was that he was shy of strangers or comparative
strangers. He did not give his confidence readily to subordinates with
whom he found himself associated for the first time. He would not
brook remonstrance, still less contradiction, from a man whom he did
not know. It was largely due to this, as it seemed to me, that he was
rather out of hand, so to speak, during the critical opening months.
It was during those opening months that he performed the greatest
services to the people of this land, that he introduced the measures
which won us the war. But it was also during those opening months,
when he was disinclined to listen to advice, that he made his worst
mistakes.
I do not believe that there was one single military authority of any
standing within the War Office, except himself, who would not have
preferred that the cream of the personnel, men who had served in the
regulars, who flocked into the ranks in response to his trumpet call
to the nation, should have been devoted in the first instance to
filling the yawning gaps that existed in the Territorial Forces, and
to providing those forces with trained reservists to fill war wastage.
Such a disposition of this very valuable material seemed preferable to
absorbing it at the outset in brand-new formations, which in any case
would be unable to take the field for many months to come. Parliament
would have readily consented to any alteration in the statutes
governing the Territorial Forces which might have been necessary. Lord
K.'s actions in this question to some extent antagonized the military
side of the War Office just at first: we were thinking of the early
future: he, as was his wont, was looking far ahead. My work was nowise
concerned with the provision of troops in any form, and in later days,
when I was often with the Chief, I never remember discussing the
Territorials with him. But it
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