atement made by the dean of Italian
statesmen, in a letter I received from him two months ago. No Italian
could speak from a more thorough knowledge of the facts than he
possessed, and that it has long been surmised that the Triplice could
not drive Italy against England appears in various publications. Gen.
Bernhardi, for instance, who knew so accurately the intentions of the
German General Staff and the secrets of the German Foreign Office,
intimates more than once that Germany and Austria, in their war for
world power, need not hope for Italy's support. Referring to Col.
Boucher's book, "L'Offensive contre L'Allemagne," he says: "Modern
French writers are already reckoning so confidently on the withdrawal
of Italy from the Triple Alliance that they no longer think it
necessary to put an army in the field against Italy, but consider that
the entire forces of France are available against Germany."[4]

[Footnote 4: Bernhardi: "Germany and the Next War." English popular
edition, Page 138.]

[Illustration: [map]]

Why Italy made the reservation in the case of England will appear when
we glance at the origin of the Triple Alliance.

In 1871 Bismarck thought that the Franco-Prussian war, by the military
losses and by the immense indemnity which it inflicted on the French
people, had rendered France powerless for a generation. But within
four years she paid the indemnity and had so far recovered in her
armament, commerce, and prosperity, that the Iron Chancellor prepared
to attack her again, and this time, to quote his butcher's phrase, "to
bleed her white." Only the certainty that the other powers would
interfere stayed his hand then.

So he set about circumventing France by other means. A league of the
three Emperors of Germany, Austria, and Russia was the combination he
preferred; but Russia proved an uncertain partner, as she feared
Germanization, on the one hand, and, on the other, she was the
encourager of pro-Slavic aspirations which ran counter to the Germans'
ambition. Bismarck, therefore, looked about him for an alternative
plan.

He would keep the friendship of Russia--even though Russia declined a
formal league--and he would lure Italy into the Germanic alliance.
England, he knew, could not be persuaded to enter a Continental
combination. Her commercial interests pointed elsewhere, and she still
clung to her policy of splendid isolation. But Italy was unattached;
and while she was the least formidable of