ermany should allow themselves to be commandeered,
apparently without a murmur, to uphold a war waged to preserve and
extend military despotism.

In addition to these direct efforts to win Italy to their side, or at
least to keep her from going over to the enemy, the Germans have been
busy since early in August with their Press Bureau, which has pursued
methods there similar to those they have made us familiar with here.
But in Italy they have been more guarded and less truculent, and they
have not, like the preposterous Bernstorff and his associates, assumed
that the public they were addressing was not only ignorant of the
simplest facts of recent European history, but were also morally
imbecile.

Although the Italians are not less susceptible than are other peoples
to be swayed by sudden political gusts, they were not at the end of
July, 1914, taken by surprise. For a long time past their King and
statesmen had deliberated as to what ought to be Italy's course in
case Germany should carry out her well-understood purpose of humbling
England. The Italians were not deceived by the increase from year to
year of the German Army. They knew perfectly well what the tremendous
efforts of the Germans to create a great navy meant. They had no
illusions as to the purpose of the strategic railways to the Belgian
frontier on the west or to the Russian border on the east. They knew
how narrowly a European war was averted during the Balkan cataclysm
two years ago. They did not wrong the Kaiser by supposing that the
immense fund which he had recently raised from "voluntary" 5 per cent.
contributions on incomes was to be given to The Hague Tribunal to
promote the cause of universal peace. They logically and honorably
decided that, if Germany provoked war, Italy would not support her.
The bond of the Triple Alliance called for no other action on her
part. Germany and Austria provoked the war; Italy stood by her
agreement.

But a still further consideration influenced her. It was understood
that, _if the war in which Germany and Austria engaged should involve
England as an enemy, Italy's obligation to support the Triple Alliance
would cease_. Since it would be suicidal for Italy to accept the
liability of a _casus foederis_ which should expose her to attack by
the English and French Navies, her participation in the Triple
Alliance always carried the proviso that it did not bind her to fight
England.

Such is the substance of the st