, No. 8,' indicating that
Hood, who had meanwhile become first sea lord, had incorporated his
idea into the regular 'Additional Fighting Instructions.'

Take, again, the case of the manoeuvre of 'breaking the line' in line
ahead. This was first practised after its long abandonment by a sudden
inspiration in Rodney's action of April 12, 1782. In the MS. signal
book as used by Rodney in that year there is no corresponding signal
or instruction. But it does contain one by Hood which he must have
added soon after the battle. It is as follows:--

'When fetching up with the enemy to leeward and on the contrary tack
to break through their line and endeavour to cut off part of their van
or rear.' It also contains another attributed to Admiral Pigot which
he probably added at Hood's suggestion when he succeeded to the
command in July 1782. It is for a particular ship 'to cut through the
enemy's line of battle, and for all the other ships to follow her in
close order to support each other.' But in both cases there is no
corresponding instruction, so that the new signals must have been
based on 'expeditional' orders issued by Pigot and Hood. The same
book has yet another additional signal 'for the leading ship to cut
through the enemy's line of battle,' apparently the latest of the
three, but not specifically attributed either to Pigot or Hood.

With the Additional Instructions used by Rodney the system culminated.
For officers with any real feeling for tactics its work was adequate.
The criticisms of Hood and Rodney on Graves's heart-breaking action
off the Chesapeake in 1781 show this clearly enough. 'When the enemy's
van was out,' wrote Hood, 'it was greatly extended beyond the centre
and rear, and might have been attacked with the whole force of the
British fleet.' And again, 'Had the centre gone to the support of the
van and the signal for the line been hauled down ... the van of the
enemy must have been cut to pieces and the rear division of the
British fleet would have been opposed to ... the centre division.'
Here, besides the vital principle of concentration, we have a germ
even of the idea of containing, and Rodney is equally emphatic. 'His
mode of fighting I will never follow. He tells me that his line did
not extend so far as the enemy's rear. I should have been sorry if it
had, and a general battle ensued. It would have given the advantage
they wished and brought their whole twenty-four ships of the line
against th