FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   267   268   269   270   271   272   273   274   275   276   277   278   279   280   281   282   283   284   285   286   287   288   289   290   291  
292   293   294   295   296   297   298   299   300   301   302   303   304   305   306   307   308   309   310   311   312   313   314   315   316   >>   >|  
alled _an extension of the perceptions by means of reasoning_. On further considering the matter, however, it will perhaps be felt that this definition does not express the whole fact--that inseparable as science may be from common knowledge, and completely as we may fill up the gap between the simplest previsions of the child and the most recondite ones of the natural philosopher, by interposing a series of previsions in which the complexity of reasoning involved is greater and greater, there is yet a difference between the two beyond that which is here described. And this is true. But the difference is still not such as enables us to draw the assumed line of demarcation. It is a difference not between common knowledge and scientific knowledge; but between the successive phases of science itself, or knowledge itself--whichever we choose to call it. In its earlier phases science attains only to _certainty_ of foreknowledge; in its later phases it further attains to _completeness_. We begin by discovering _a_ relation: we end by discovering _the_ relation. Our first achievement is to foretell the _kind_ of phenomenon which will occur under specific conditions: our last achievement is to foretell not only the kind but the _amount_. Or, to reduce the proposition to its most definite form--undeveloped science is _qualitative_ prevision: developed science is _quantitative_ prevision. This will at once be perceived to express the remaining distinction between the lower and the higher stages of positive knowledge. The prediction that a piece of lead will take more force to lift it than a piece of wood of equal size, exhibits certainty, but not completeness, of foresight. The kind of effect in which the one body will exceed the other is foreseen; but not the amount by which it will exceed. There is qualitative prevision only. On the other hand, the prediction that at a stated time two particular planets will be in conjunction; that by means of a lever having arms in a given ratio, a known force will raise just so many pounds; that to decompose a specified quantity of sulphate of iron by carbonate of soda will require so many grains--these predictions exhibit foreknowledge, not only of the nature of the effects to be produced, but of the magnitude, either of the effects themselves, of the agencies producing them, or of the distance in time or space at which they will be produced. There is not only qualitative but quantitative
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   267   268   269   270   271   272   273   274   275   276   277   278   279   280   281   282   283   284   285   286   287   288   289   290   291  
292   293   294   295   296   297   298   299   300   301   302   303   304   305   306   307   308   309   310   311   312   313   314   315   316   >>   >|  



Top keywords:
science
 

knowledge

 

difference

 

phases

 

qualitative

 

prevision

 

discovering

 

relation

 

greater

 
certainty

reasoning

 

attains

 

foreknowledge

 

completeness

 

quantitative

 

exceed

 

amount

 
produced
 
common
 
express

effects

 

prediction

 

achievement

 

foretell

 

previsions

 

exhibits

 

foresight

 

distinction

 
positive
 

stages


higher
 
perceived
 

remaining

 
predictions
 
exhibit
 
grains
 

require

 

carbonate

 
nature
 
magnitude

distance
 

producing

 

agencies

 
sulphate
 
quantity
 

planets

 

conjunction

 

stated

 

foreseen

 

pounds