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ve actions--to at once see that the nation of _likeness_ is that from which the nomenclature of objects takes its rise. Were there space we might go on to point out how this law of life is traceable, not only in the origin but in the development of language; how in primitive tongues the plural is made by a duplication of the singular, which is a multiplication of the word to make it _like_ the multiplicity of the things; how the use of metaphor--that prolific source of new words--is a suggesting of ideas that are _like_ the ideas to be conveyed in some respect or other; and how, in the copious use of simile, fable, and allegory among uncivilised races, we see that complex conceptions, which there is yet no direct language for, are rendered, by presenting known conceptions more or less _like_ them. This view is further confirmed, and the predominance of this notion of likeness in primitive times further illustrated, by the fact that our system of presenting ideas to the eye originated after the same fashion. Writing and printing have descended from picture-language. The earliest mode of permanently registering a fact was by depicting it on a wall; that is--by exhibiting something as _like_ to the thing to be remembered as it could be made. Gradually as the practice grew habitual and extensive, the most frequently repeated forms became fixed, and presently abbreviated; and, passing through the hieroglyphic and ideographic phases, the symbols lost all apparent relations to the things signified: just as the majority of our spoken words have done. Observe again, that the same thing is true respecting the genesis of reasoning. The _likeness_ that is perceived to exist between cases, is the essence of all early reasoning and of much of our present reasoning. The savage, having by experience discovered a relation between a certain object and a certain act, infers that the _like_ relation will be found in future cases. And the expressions we constantly use in our arguments--"_analogy_ implies," "the cases are not _parallel_," "by _parity_ of reasoning," "there is no _similarity_,"--show how constantly the idea of likeness underlies our ratiocinative processes. Still more clearly will this be seen on recognising the fact that there is a certain parallelism between reasoning and classification; that the two have a common root; and that neither can go on without the other. For on the one hand, it is a familiar truth that the
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